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FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CHARITABLE




Charitable organizations have long enjoyed special benefits be-
cause the public has bestowed a special trust on them. This special
trust is in danger of eroding due to abuse by some nonprofit execu-
tives and board members., One noted example of such abuse is the
United Way scandal, in which the former president of United Way of
America, William Aramony, was convicted of stealing over six
hundred thousand dollars from the organization.2 As a result of the
United Way scandal and others like it,3 the nonprofit sector has been
under increasing pressure to find a way to hold charitable organiza-
tions and their boards accountable to the public.4
Resolving the board accountability problem is daunting. Any
proposed solutions must weigh possible negative consequences to
charities in serving their missions, or in relation to any one of their
stakeholders, including donors, board members, corporations, the
* C.P.A.; J.D. candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology,
2003. Ms. Vanderwarren is an independent financial consultant, specializing in nonprofit
organizations. This Note was written as part of the J.D. program at Chicago-Kent College of
Law. The author wishes to thank Professor Evelyn Brody for her invaluable comments and
insight, Linda Coleman, Robert MacNally, and Ronald Osborne for sharing their experience
and knowledge in the financial management of nonprofit organizations, and Sidney Silhan and
Michael Shapiro for their comments and editing assistance.
1. See Eileen M. Evans & William D. Evans, Jr., "No Good Deed Goes Unpunished":
Personal Liability of Trustees and Administrators of Private Colleges and Universities, 33 TORT
& INS. L.J. 1107, 1107-08 (1998).
2. Karen W. Arenson, Former United Way Chief Guilty in Theft of More Than $600,000,
N.Y. TIMES. Apr. 4, 1995, at Al.
3. See infra Part IV.A.
4. In order to retain the public's trust, charity managers must perform their duties at a
higher level than that required by the law. Failure to maintain the public trust could have
negative consequences for charities, including decreased donations and decreased ability to
govern themselves. See Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV.
1400, 1414-15 (1998).
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government, and beneficiaries. In addition, proposed reforms must
address the need for public accountability without interfering with the
independence that charities require to carry out their missions.'
Philosophical and practical considerations have rendered identi-
fying a one-size-fits-all solution elusive. How should proposed
reforms be mandated? Should reforms be left to the charitable
community or should they be legislated? If legislation is the answer,
should the federal government tackle the problem or should the state
governments handle the task?
Once these questions are answered, new questions concerning
enforcement of reforms emerge. Who is best equipped to enforce
reforms? Who should have standing to bring actions against chari-
ties? Should an oversight agency similar to the SEC be created to
monitor charitable organizations?
Other significant policy considerations underlie the debate. If
reforms are too costly, the already overtaxed resources of public
charities will be further stretched. The cost of reforms would come at
the expense of the beneficiaries of public charities. In addition,
imposing burdensome and costly procedures designed for poorly
managed charities at the expense of well-run charities seems funda-
mentally unfair, as well as inefficient.
6
This Note focuses on tax-exempt organizations authorized by
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.7 Section 501(c)(3)
organizations are those organized and operated exclusively for
"religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition,... or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals.... "I Although the code section makes no mention of the
term, section 501(c)(3) organizations are generally referred to simply
as "charities." 9 Other code sections cover tax-exempt organizations
5. See Evelyn Brody, Accountability and Public Trust, in THE STATE OF AMERICA'S
NONPROFIT SECIOR (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript on file with author).
6. See Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers:
Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 637 (1998) ("Harsh new
fiduciary requirements, or uncontrolled exposure to litigation ... would almost certainly have
counterproductive effects.")
7. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
8. id.
9. See Robert C. DeGaudenzi, Tax-Exempt Public Charities: Increasing Accountability
and Compliance, 36 CATH. LAW. 203, 203 (1995).
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such as labor or trade unions, credit unions, lobbying organizations,
and other mutual benefit corporations.0
Part I of this Note discusses the basic features distinguishing
nonprofit organizations from for-profit organizations. Part II
summarizes the legal framework currently in place to address the
accountability of charitable organizations to the public. Part III
recommends that charitable boards be encouraged to appoint an
audit committee function to address the need for improved charitable
board accountability. Part IV illustrates how implementing an audit
committee in several cases could have prevented, or at least detected
at an early stage, inside and employee fraud.
I. DISTINGUISHING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS FROM FOR-
PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
Charitable organizations share some similarities with for-profit
organizations;" however, several important features distinguish the
charitable organization from the business corporation. Features
distinct to charitable organizations include the nondistribution
constraint, the volunteer nature of charitable boards, and the tax
exemptions granted by the states and the federal government. The
law reflects the different social policies inherent in governing
charitable organizations versus business corporations.
The nondistribution constraint'2 is the most significant factor
distinguishing charitable corporations from business corporations. 3
Other benefits, such as tax exemptions, flow from and are justified by
adherence to the nondistribution restriction. Simply stated, the
nondistribution constraint forbids charitable corporations from
distributing net income (or profit) to any private shareholder or
10. See James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda
for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 657-67 (1985), for a detailed classification of the various types
of nonprofit corporations.
11. Like business corporations, nonprofit organizational size can range from a local "mom-
and-pop" size soup kitchen to a complex multinational organization offering a substantial menu
of services. See David W. Barrett, Note, A Call for More Lenient Director Liability Standards
for Small, Charitable Nonprofit Corporations, 71 IND. L.J. 967,969 (1996).
12. See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
497, 501-02 (1981); see also Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable
Organizations, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 227, 258.
13. For simplicity, this discussion assumes that the organization is a nonprofit corporation
(rather than a charitable trust). Most American charities are corporations.
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individual."4 Charitable resources are expended (or saved and
invested for future expenditure) for the beneficiaries of charities,
rather than distributed to owners or stockholders.
Nonprofit boards generally follow the corporate model of orga-
nization; 5 even so, significant practical differences result between the
operation of nonprofit boards and for-profit boards. First, nonprofit
boards are typically composed of volunteer directors who are
generally unpaid.16 Charities often recruit nonprofit board members
for their fundraising ability or prestige in the community rather than
for their ability to lead the organization. 7 Second, nonprofit directors
may lack the corporate or legal expertise that their for-profit
counterparts often possess."' Because charitable board members are
generally not compensated and may lack expertise, they have little
incentive to actively oversee the activities of the charitable
organizations they serve.
Congress and the state legislatures have enacted various laws
reflecting a policy that encourages charitable donations and ensures
the public that such donations will be spent in furtherance of the
charitable mission. The federal government provides a tax incentive
encouraging individuals and corporations to contribute to charitable
organizations by allowing taxpayers to deduct charitable contribu-
tions from adjusted gross income for purposes of calculating income
tax. 9 In addition, qualifying charitable organizations are exempt
from paying federal income tax,20 and most states also provide tax
exemptions from income, property, or state sales taxes.2' By provid-
ing for tax incentives and tax exemptions, legislatures recognize the
public benefits derived from charities and, through tax policy,
14. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). The code explicitly states that "no part of the net
earnings ... [of the organization may inure] to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual." Id.
15. See Fishman, supra note 10, at 619-40. Fishman discusses the twentieth-century change
in preference in the organizational form of nonprofit organizations from the trust form to the
corporate form. The charitable corporation evolved in large part due to testators' fears that the
English common law of trusts did not survive the American Revolution.
16. Tax-exempt entities may not distribute profits to directors or employees, although
reasonable compensation can be paid. See Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla of Individual Profit: In
Search of Private Inurement and Excess Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REV. 575, 576 (2000).
17. See Thomas H. Boyd, A Call to Reform the Duties of Directors Under State Not-For-
Profit Corporation Statutes, 72 IOWA L. REV. 725, 728 (1987); Fishman, supra note 10, at 674.
18. Fishman, supra note 10, at 675.
19. I.R.C. § 170(a) (2000).
20. I.R.C. § 501(a) (2000).
21. See, e.g., 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/205 (2000).
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encourage public support of charitable missions.22 Tax policy also
dictates, to a large extent, the manner in which charitable organiza-
tions are regulated.
II. CURRENT STANDARDS OF BOARD GOVERNANCE AND
REGULATION OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
A. Obligations of Directors and Officers
The charitable community 23 has long grappled with the issue of
how to hold board members to a higher level of responsibility without
adversely affecting board recruitment efforts. 24  Effective board
leadership is crucial because charities are, for the most part, self-
regulated. 25 One of the barriers to effective board leadership in the
charitable sector is the lack of incentives for board members to
properly monitor the organization; comparatively, these incentives
are often present in the business sector.26 For example, charitable
board members are not subject to the threat of derivative suits from
shareholders or the oversight of agencies such as the SEC.
27
Like directors of business corporations and trustees of private
trusts, the courts hold directors of nonprofit organizations and
trustees of charitable trusts to the fiduciary duties of loyalty and due
care.28 The duty of loyalty imposes an obligation on directors or
trustees of nonprofit organizations to set aside personal concerns and
make decisions that are in the best interests of the organization. 29 In
other words, the duty of loyalty forbids the director from profiting at
the expense of the organization or engaging in self-dealing.
The duty of due care has been relaxed from earlier notions that
imposed a strict trust standard and required the highest degree of
22. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924).
23. "Far from homogeneous, the nonprofit sector comprises a complex web of
participants." Brody, supra note 5, at 3. Business, government, and the public at large have all
formed relationships with nonprofit organizations on some level. See id.
24. See Goldschmid, supra note 6, at 637.
25. See Fishman, supra note 10, at 677.
26. Peter Frumkin & Alice Andre-Clark, Nonprofit Compensation and the Market, 21 U.
HAW. L. REV. 425,461-62 (1999).
27. See Fishman, supra note 10, at 675.
28. Brody, supra note 4, at 1406.
29. The ABA Model Nonprofit Corporation Act adopts the following language: "A
director shall discharge his or her duties ... in a manner the director reasonably believes to be
in the best interest of the corporation." REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1987).
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honor and integrity from directors of business corporations. 30 Some
have argued that the strict trust standard should be adopted for
directors of charitable organizations because the beneficiaries of
charitable organizations, unlike stockholders, do not have the power
to voice concerns. 3' Nevertheless, most courts have relaxed the
standard of care for directors of nonprofit organizations, and instead
they have applied the more lenient standard used for corporate
directors.32 For example, the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act
requires a director to exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position under similar circumstances. 3  Expectations
regarding director activity are minimal-nonprofit directors are
expected to attend board meetings, review material submitted to the
board, and request any other information needed to carry out their
responsibilities as directors.34 Noticeably absent from the Model Act
are any expectations that directors ensure that management is
engaging in sound practices.
The shift towards less stringent standards of care for directors
exhibits sensitivity to practical factors, namely that nonprofit
directors are typically volunteers and are not paid for their services.
35
Stricter standards of liability could also impact the efforts of charita-
ble organizations to recruit directors.36 Finally, board members bring
different contributions to the charitable organization; while business
experience is important, of equal importance to many charities is the
board member's ability to bring prestige, donations, or contacts to the
organization.37
30. See Evans & Evans, supra note 1, at 1115.
31. Id. at 1117.
32. See, e.g., La. World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 1147, 1152 (5th Cir. 1989) (on
petition for rehearing) (upholding the same standard for nonprofit directors as was adopted by
the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act).
33. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT § 8.30 (1987).
34. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. 2.
35. See Jones, supra note 16.
36. See Evans & Evans, supra note 1, at 1117.
37. See Fishman. supra note 10. at 674.
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B. Public Disclosure of Form 990: IRS and Public Oversight of
Charitable Organizations
1. Form 990: Congressional Policy
Congress has an interest in charitable organizations maintaining
credibility with the public. In an effort to quell public concern
surrounding several highly noted cases of misuse of funds by charity
executives, Congress enacted legislation requiring that any organiza-
tion required to file a Form 990 (the annual information return filed
with the IRS) must make Form 990 available to the public.38 Organi-
zations that fail to provide for public inspection of Form 990 are
subject to IRS penalties.39
Form 990 collects financial information, including details such as
the organization's five highest-paid employees, five highest-paid
contractors, and fundraising expenses.40 In addition, the return
requires the organization to disclose any transactions that involved
board members.4 The information is useful to the IRS in flagging
possible tax violations such as excess-benefit transactions42 or cases
where revocation of tax-exempt status should be considered.
43
The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation" asserted in a 2000
report that increased public disclosure would facilitate oversight of
38. Churches and exempt organizations with less than twenty-five thousand dollars in gross
receipts need not file. I.R.C. § 6104 (2000). At the time section 6104 was enacted, Form 990
was available from the IRS; however, access to the information was difficult to obtain. The new
law requires that filing charities make Form 990 directly accessible to the public. §
6104(d)(1)(A). Prior to the new disclosure requirements, one commentator noted that during
congressional hearings, the public disclosure requirements in place were not serving their
purpose, in part, because some public charities were failing to provide the information. See
DeGaudenzi, supra note 9, at 221.
39. I.R.C. § 6652(c)(1) (2000).
40. I.R.S. Form 990, OMB No. 1545-0047 (2001).
41. See I.R.S. Form 990 Sched. A, OMB No. 1545-0047 (2001).
42. I.R.C. § 4958 imposes a 25 percent tax on officers, directors, and trustees of tax-exempt
organizations (and a ten percent tax on approving managers of tax-exempt organizations) where
those insiders are the beneficiaries of an excess benefit transaction. The sanction is an
intermediate step available before revoking a charitable organization's tax-exempt status. See
also Nancy G. Itnyre, A Proposed Solution to a Problem Created by Worker Reclassification, 77
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 273,292-98 (2000).
43. See generally Peter Swords, The Form 990 as an Accountability Tool for 501(c)(3)
Nonprofits, 51 TAx LAW. 571 (1998).
44. The Joint Committee on Taxation was established by Congress and consists of ten
members: five members from the Senate Finance Committee and five members from the House
Committee on Ways and Means. The Committee is authorized to conduct studies and
investigations on the administration of tax laws by the Internal Revenue Service. Pursuant to
section 3802 of the IRS Reform Act, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation performed a
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tax-exempt organizations, increase compliance with tax and other
laws, and encourage charitable giving by holding tax-exempt organi-
zations accountable to the public45  The committee staff also
suggested that public disclosure is especially appropriate where the
activities of tax-exempt organizations relieve government resources.4 6
The committee's rationale is that since government operations (which
are paid for with public funds) are open to public inspection, the
operations of charities, which provide services that might otherwise
be required of the government, should also be open to public
inspection4
7
Whether Form 990 disclosure has impacted public accountability
is debatable a.4  The format of Form 990 is structured to enable the
IRS to flag tax code violations, not to evaluate the organization as a
whole.49 Merely setting out financial information and disclosing it to
the public is inadequate for public oversight purposes and may even
cause confusion or misunderstanding among members of the public0
Further, the public is not in the legal or practical position to oversee
the activities of charitable organizations.1 Perhaps the public's true
power is demonstrated when people close their checkbooks in
reaction to cases where charity executives or boards have grossly
abused their trust.
Public disclosure under Form 990 may deter some charity execu-
tives from misusing organization funds or engaging in self-dealing
study to aid in determining whether greater disclosure of information by charities would serve
the public interest. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, U.S. CONG.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, U.S. CONGRESS:
HISTORY AND ROLE OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (2000),
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/tablhist.html.
45. STAFF THE OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, U.S. Cong., Doc. No. JCS-1-00,
STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 3802 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND
REFORM ACT OF 1998, VOLUME II: STUDY OF DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS RELATING TO TAX-
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 80 (2000), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/pubs00.html (web
page provides link to PDF document).
46. Id. at 63 n.140.
47. Id.
48. Compare Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 131, 144 (1993) (arguing that public disclosure requirements do not operate as
a deterrent), with STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 45. at 80
(opining that public disclosure will increase compliance with federal tax laws).
49. See generally Swords, supra note 43.
50. See Brody, supra note 5, at 34.
51. See generally Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties
of Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655 (1998).
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transactions; however, the more likely result is that the information
will never find its way onto Form 990.52 Nearly 25 percent of charities
receiving more than $5 million in contributions reported that they
spent nothing on fundraising, indicating that many charities are
"simply not complying with IRS rules." 53  Even where reported
information might tend to expose misappropriation of charitable
funds, the odds of detection by the public or the IRS are slim.
5 4
In 1998, 10,353 out of 644,496 tax-exempt organization returns
were examined by revenue agents of the IRS-less than 2 percent of
all tax-exempt returns. 55  Of the returns examined, more than half
were taxable returns such as payroll tax reports (Forms 940, 941, 942,
and 943) and unrelated business income reports (Form 990-T).5 6 In
other words, less than 1 percent of Forms 990 or 990EZ (filed by
small organizations) were examined. 7
52. See Swords, supra note 43, at 578.
53. The findings of the study conducted by the Urban Institute's Center on Nonprofits and
Philanthropy sampled computerized returns for the tax years 1997-1998. The Chronicle of
Philanthropy also examined returns from states that require professional fundraisers to disclose
their clients. The Chronicle noted that in many cases fundraising consultants reported that they
had received payments from charities, but the same charities reported no fundraising expenses
on their federal returns. Charities' Zero-Sum Filing Game, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, May 18.
2000, at 21.
54. See IRS DATA BOOK, PUB. No. 55B, at tbl. 20 (1998). The IRS Data Book is a
statistical publication providing detailed information including revenues generated, returns
filed, and returns examined.
55. See id.
56. See id. at tbl. 21.
57. See id. at tbls. 20-21.
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TABLE 1: FROM IRS DATA BOOK TABLES 20 AND 21
Tax-exempt organization returns by type
Form 990 and 990EZ 4,145
Forms 990PF, 5227, 1041A, and 1120 350
Form 990C 88
Form 990POL 107
Forms 8038, 8038G, 8038GC, 8038T, 126
and 8328
Total non-taxable returns 4816
Forms 940, 941, 942, and 943 2,845
Form 990-T 1,717
Form 4720 50
Forms 1040 and 1120 adjusted 925
Related taxable returns 5,537
Total tax-exempt organization 10,353
returns examined by revenue agents
in Fiscal Year 1998
2. Should the IRS Take On the Role of Policing Charities?
The appropriate charity policing roles of the states, the federal
government, 8 and the public are often debated. Currently, the states,
through their attorneys general, have the primary burden for policing
charities.59 The public is poorly situated to handle such a role due to
legal and practical considerations. 60 In more recent years, Congress
has granted the IRS a larger role in overseeing tax-exempt organiza-
tions.61
58. The constitutional issues surrounding charitable organizations and the right to
association and the possible negative effects of an overly involved federal government are
beyond the scope of this Note.
59. See Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L. REV.
433, 481 (1996).
60. See Atkinson, supra note 51.
61. See generally Brody, supra note 4, at 1439 ("We have been moving to a system of
federalizing oversight of charities.").
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The IRS is not the appropriate agency to regulate charities; its
role should continue to be limited to collecting revenue. Not only is
policing charities outside the scope of the IRS's traditional area of
responsibility, 62 but also taking on this new role would require
substantial additional resources. Consistent with its tax collection
role, where the IRS does examine exempt organization returns,
resources are more heavily invested in examining taxable versus
nontaxable returns filed by charities.63  The IRS's role in policing
charitable organizations should continue to be that of collecting tax
revenues. Assigning to the IRS a larger role in policing charities
would be costly to taxpayers and would not be as effective as
requiring boards, which have a greater ability to know their organiza-
tions intimately, to exercise greater care by implementing audit
committees.
This is not to say that the IRS cannot be helpful to the cause, but
it should do so within its sphere of competence such as in the
enforcement of intermediate sanctions. 64 Congress recently gave the
IRS the authority to impose a 25 percent tax directly on charity
executives, officers, and managers who profit by engaging in excess
benefit transactions. 6 This is an example of an appropriate role for
the IRS and falls within the traditional scope of IRS oversight. These
intermediate sanctions can help in the battle to hold charity execu-
tives accountable by providing a disincentive for executives and
others within charitable organizations to engage in unethical activities
for financial gain.66 In addition, intermediate sanctions provide the
IRS with the broad authority to punish the bad actor, where previ-
ously the IRS was limited only to denying tax-exempt status, which
hurt the entire organization and beneficiaries.
67
62. "The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is responsible for determining, assessing, and
collecting internal revenue in the United States." U.S. Department of Treasury, Duties &
Functions: Internal Revenue Service, at http://www.treas.gov/education/duties/bureaus/irs.html
(last visited April 30, 2002).
63. See IRS DATA BOOK, supra note 54, at tbl. 21.
64. Intermediate sanctions are an alternative to the severe sanction of revoking an
organization's tax-exempt status. The Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 authorizes the IRS to impose
monetary penalties on directors and officers who receive an economic benefit that is higher than
the actual value received by the organization. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2000).
65. See id.
66. See generally Douglas M. Mancino, New 'Intermediate Sanctions' May Cause Public
Charities to Change the Way They Do Business, 85 J. TAX'N 368 (1996).
67. See Alice A. Noble et al., Charitable Hospital Accountability: A Review and Analysis of
Legal and Policy Initiatives, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 116, 119 (1998).
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C. Standing
1. Public Disclosure Requirements Have Limited Use
Even if the public, in reviewing Form 990, were able to catch
more instances of executive or employee fraud, the issue of who has
standing to sue a nonprofit organization still impedes enforcement.
Currently, in most states, the only parties who have standing to sue
for breaches of fiduciary duty by a nonprofit director are the attorney
general or a director. 8  Generally, directors do not sue public
charities;69 in practice, if any suit is brought against a charity fiduciary,
it is the state's attorney general who brings it."' Any monetary
settlement or award is generally payable to the charity.
Current standing doctrine frustrates the purpose of making Form
990 available to public inspection. Congress intended public disclo-
sure of Form 990 as a means of holding charities accountable to the
public.7' Although the public has access to information, without the
ability to bring a case in court, they cannot, in the legal sense, truly
hold charities accountable for their actions.
Expanding the current standing doctrine72 to allow the public to
bring actions against nonprofit fiduciaries would come at great cost to
charitable organizations and their beneficiaries. Fiduciaries are often
entitled to indemnification from the charity for their legal expenses,
and charitable dollars spent on unnecessary litigation would reduce
the amount available to further the charitable mission of the organi-
zation.73 Although granting standing to the public might result in
exposing a larger number of dishonest charity executives, the burden
of litigation would be unfair to the many well-managed organizations.
68. See Fishman, supra note 10, at 669-70.
69. See id. at 669; see also Manne, supra note 12, at 249-50.
70. "Standing limitations for nonprofit entities are grounded largely in the outdated notion
of the state as parens patriae, and thus, for much of the nation's history, have relegated
enforcement to the exclusive province of the state." Manne, supra note 12, at 241.
71. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 45, at 128.
72. For an excellent discussion of possible candidates for expanded standing see Atkinson,
supra note 51.
73. See Fishman, supra note 10, at 670.
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2. Are the Attorneys General Effectively Policing Nonprofit
Organizations?
The state attorney general is the chief guardian of the public's
interest in charitable organizations.74 Although one might expect that
the attorney general would closely regulate charities, especially
because they lack shareholders to provide oversight, this is not the
case.75 The only obligation most states impose on charities is filing an
annual report attesting to the charity's continuing existence and
providing names and addresses of directors.6 Often, state actions
against charities result from media attention77 or from complaints by
board members or employees.7" The attorney general can filter out
frivolous or nuisance suits, thereby avoiding unnecessary costs to
charitable organizations. 9
Political and social reasons explain the limited role that attorneys
general play in regulating charities. For the most part, attorneys
general become involved only when self-dealing conduct is alleged.80
They understandably do not want to take on the role of managing
"at-risk" charities.8' In addition, attorneys general have limited
resources, and regulation of charities necessarily takes a back seat to
maintaining public security and punishing violent crime.
82
The lack of policing by state attorneys general has led some to
suggest that the federal government should step in and subject
charities to closer scrutiny.83 The federal government's role in
policing charities should be limited, however; a limited role, such as
imposing intermediate sanctions, is appropriate. These sanctions
impose stiff monetary penalties on directors and employees who
engage in self-dealing transactions or receive excess compensation for
74. Nina J. Crimm, Why All Is Not Quiet on the "Home Front" for Charitable
Organizations, 29 N.M. L. REV. 1,24 (1999).
75. See Brody, supra note 5, at 12.
76. See Brody, supra note 59, at 481.
77. The activities of William Aramony, former president of United Way of America, and
others involved in the scandal were brought to the attorney general's attention as a result of
media investigations.
78. See Brody, supra note 59, at 481.
79. See Atkinson, supra note 51, at 684-85.
80. See Brody, supra note 59, at 499.
81. See id.
82. See Atkinson, supra note 51, at 683.
83. Regina L. Herzlinger, Can Trust in Government and Nonprofits Be Restored?, HARV.
Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 103.
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their services without interfering with the overall management of
charitable organizations.8
III. AUDIT COMMITTEES: A Low-COST (AND OFTEN No-COST)
SOLUTION TO GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
Requiring all charities to have an audit committee function is the
best way to prevent executive misconduct and hold charity boards
accountable for overseeing the organization. The board has the
authority and obligation to oversee and regulate the activities of the
charitable organization and is in a better position than the federal or
state governments to know the intimate details of the particular
organization. Indeed, the board may appoint appropriate committees
to ensure that the fiscal policies of the charity are sound, and that
fraud and embezzlement are prevented, or, at least, detected.,5 The
need for boards to be accountable and held responsible for upholding
their duties is vital to improving the public's perception of charities.
Implementing audit committees would represent a large step towards
regaining and maintaining the public's trust in charitable organiza-
tions.m
Because nonprofit board members have various reasons for
serving on the board,87 one way to ensure that the board provides
financial oversight is to identify specific board members who are
willing to accept the responsibility associated with serving on an audit
committee. Boards are composed of volunteers, and the structure of
the charitable board has come about through tradition. 8 Rather than
bifurcating the board, as some have suggested, into a board of
advisors and a board of managers,8 9 appointment of an audit commit-
tee 9° would ensure that the board is overseeing the financial man-
84. See generally Swords, supra note 43.
85. See Brody, supra note 4, at 1415-17 (discussing the different organizational forms of
charities).
86. Id. at 1414.
87. Board members are often unclear about their role in the organization. Some board
members may try to micromanage the organization where such management is not needed or
wanted. Others perceive their mission in terms of fundraising, while still others "use their
appointment to add a notch on their social-climbing belt." Regina L. Herzlinger, Effective
Oversight: A Guide for Nonprofit Directors, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1994, at 52.
88. See generally Fishman, supra note 10.
89. Id. at 679-83.
90. The "audit committee" could be the finance committee or an independent committee
that reports to the board and performs the functions of a traditional audit committee. I am
advocating that all boards have an "audit committee function"; whether a traditional audit
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agement of the organization without disrupting the board's traditional
structure and effectiveness.
Bifurcating the board could remove some of the appeal of board
membership and make it more difficult for charities to recruit board
members.91 In larger organizations, board members often join in
order to network and mingle with leaders in the community. Some of
those leaders may add prestige to the organization, though they may
not actively participate in managing the organization. Other mem-
bers may lend assistance to the organization by giving or obtaining
large contributions, and may not be highly involved in governing.
Conversely, other members may be solely interested in fulfilling the
role of managing the organization.
Maintaining current board structures, but providing for an audit
committee function, could both encourage voluntarism and facilitate
board recruitment, while providing the needed oversight. Adopting
this structure also acknowledges that volunteers have different
reasons for becoming involved with charities and will allow board
members to continue to network with each other. Finally, if boards
take the self-help step of requiring competent and accountable audit
committees, the need for government regulation of charitable
organizations will diminish.
Some organizations do not appoint a separate audit committee;
rather, the finance committee assumes the role of the audit commit-
tee. The important factor is that the organization has identified
individual board members who have accepted primary responsibility
for financial oversight of the organization;92 a finance committee can
easily fulfill this role. Financial oversight includes hiring independent
auditors and recommending financial policies to the board, particu-
larly those policies related to risk management of employees and
board members.93
Not only is establishing an audit committee perhaps the best way
for a board to control the financial operations of an organization, it is
also the least expensive. Organizations could hire consultants or
committee is appointed or the board uses some other means to accomplish this oversight is a
formality.
91. See Herzlinger, supra note 83.
92. See ERNST & YOUNG LLP, AUDIT COMMITTEES: IMPLEMENTING THE NEW RULES, at
app. B (2000) (highlighting some of the basic responsibilities of for-profit corporation audit
committees).
93. See id. at 9-11.
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audit firms to perform operational audits; however, this cost may be
prohibitive for many organizations. In addition, audit committees can
more easily adjust the scope or frequency of their review based on the
needs of the organization. The prevention or early detection of
employee theft, both in fiscal terms and in terms of a damaged public
image, can also be avoided.
A. Who Should Guard the Guardians?
At this point, we are brought full circle to the issue of who should
police charities. This Note has advocated that boards should be the
main source of oversight; however, some group must oversee the
boards to assure donors and the public that their charitable dollars
are being properly managed. Many options to improve charity
governance exist, including increased oversight of charitable boards
by the federal government, state governments, donors, accrediting
bodies, and insurance companies.
The federal government could require that certain standards for
financial accountability be met, including that the organization
maintains an audit committee function as part of its regular board
activities. Provisions for failure to comply could range from mone-
tary penalties to revocation of tax-exempt status. Several problems
would arise, however, if the federal government became overly
involved in policing charity boards. First, charities are closely tied to
the right of freedom of association, 94 and federal involvement in this
area could negatively impact this right.95 Furthermore, the federal
government is not currently in the position to assess the quality of the
individual audit committee functions of charities. To do so would
require significant resources and increased budget dollars devoted to
this area. For these reasons, the federal government should continue
in its current limited role of granting tax-exempt status to new
94. See Boys Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (discussing that the right to
freely associate is crucial in preventing others from imposing their views on groups who hold
different points of view).
95. The Joint Committee on Taxation was called upon to investigate allegations, which the
Committee determined were unfounded, of IRS bias in handling determination letter requests
where the organizations represented views opposed to those of the Clinton administration.
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, U.S. Cong.. Doc. No. JCS-3-00, REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HANDLING OF
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATION MATTERS 4-11 (2000), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/
pubs00.html (web page provides link to PDF document).
[Vol. 77:963
2002] FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 979
charities, investigating areas where tax-exempt status should be
questioned, and managing other federal tax issues.
The states could also enact legislation requiring that charities
establish audit committees. Laws are powerful; however, the means
required to enforce them are costly to taxpayers. In order to properly
assess whether charities have competent audit committees, states
would have to expend funds to hire additional staff. Generally, the
states prefer to stay out of the business of charities unless problems
arise and it is appropriate for the state attorney general to intervene.
96
Perhaps donors are the best choice for encouraging, or even in-
sisting, that charitable boards take ownership of their board responsi-
bilities. Donors have the power to withhold their contributions if
they believe an organization is not being managed properly. Such
donors include rank-and-file public donors, foundations, and even the
federal, state, and local governments in their capacity as "donors."
Foundations and the government generally are sources of the
larger donations on which charities are highly dependent. Govern-
ment funding often takes the form of contracts rather than dona-
tions.97 Program funding already depends on factors including the
financial health of the organization.98 These funding sources hold a
position of power over charities, and could require proof of a well-
functioning audit committee as a prerequisite for monetary awards.
While this would place a larger burden on foundation and govern-
ment resources during the grant application phase, it would benefit
them in the long run because these groups would have reassurance
that monies given to charities will be used for their designated
purpose.
Members of the public generally are not large donors, and can-
not individually insist that board duties are fulfilled. However,
accrediting bodies such as the National Charities Information Bureau
(NCIB) can provide the public with information about the soundness
and structure of charitable boards. 99 This would give the public the
96. See Brody, supra note 5, at 12.
97. See Brody, supra note 59, at 445 (noting that government contracts have become the
largest funding source for charities).
98. Applications to foundations typically require financial data, explanations for deficits,
and so on. Governmental agencies at the federal, state, and local level often require very strict
financial accountability because these entities are accountable to their taxpayers.
99. The NCIB evaluates charities based on certain standards and provides information to
the public as to whether a charity has met those standards. The NCIB's number one standard is
board governance; all other standards, it states, relate back to this most important standard.
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ability to assess where its contributions are most likely to be used to
further the mission of their chosen organization."I'
Organizations such as such as the National Charities Information
Bureau evaluate and provide valuable information to the public as to
whether individual charities have met certain minimum standards
established by the organization.10 The NCIB's primary emphasis is
on board governance, and the NCIB recognizes fiscal guidance that
includes responsibility for investment management decisions, internal
accounting controls, and budget decisions as an indication of sound
board governance.
Organizations that evaluate charities, as well as accrediting bod-
ies, already lead the way in providing nonprofits with incentives to
conform to at least minimum standards. Most charities do not want
to be listed as not meeting the minimum standards. Accrediting
bodies have a special power in that charities wishing to attain the
benefits of accreditation will have the incentive to institute an audit
committee function.
Insurance companies, which provide directors & officers liability
insurance, are another possible group that could push boards to adopt
an audit committee function. Monetary incentives, in the form of
discounted premiums, could be offered for charities whose boards
exhibit sound financial management practices. The higher premiums
would then be paid by those charities that are truly creating the risk
of misuse or theft of organization funds.
B. The Audit Committee Function
The primary purpose of the audit committee is to provide finan-
cial oversight for the organization.102 The SEC has recently adopted
regulations requiring for-profit corporations to establish audit
committees that adhere to defined standards.03 Though an exact
replication of the SEC regulations might be too restrictive, the
The NCIB has merged with the Better Business Bureau's Philanthropic Advisory Service. See
generally http://www.give.org, last visited (April 28, 2002).
100. See generally id.
101. See generally id.
102. See generally H. Felix Kloman, The Audit Committee and Its Expanding Role in Risk
Management, COMMUNITY RISK MGMT. & INS., (Nonprofit Risk Mgmt. Ctr., Wash. D.C.), at
http://www.nonprofitrisk.org/nwsltr/archive/nl200 5.htm (Summer 2000).
103. See generally NAT'L ASS'N OF CORPORATE DIRS., REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE
RIBBON COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMI'T'EES (2000).
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existence of a model operating in the for-profit community means
that a requirement pressuring charities to adopt an audit committee
function would not cause charities to navigate an uncharted course.
Charities and others might argue that recruiting board members
is already difficult, and that requiring an audit committee function
could create additional difficulties in board recruitment efforts.
Rather than requiring immediate change, bodies such as accrediting
boards and insurance companies could provide time for nonprofits to
phase in an audit committee function."" This would give charities
time to recruit and train audit committee members, and to define
exactly what the purpose of the audit committee function should be
for their particular organization.
Larger charities may encounter less difficulty. They can adopt
policies that facilitate recruiting board members for the audit
committee function. Larger, prestigious charities often base board
membership on the board member's ability to meet established
fundraising goals. Where such charities have difficulty engaging
current board members to serve on audit committees, fundraising
standards could be relaxed in order to attract financially literate (but
politically unconnected) audit committee members.
Smaller charities may also be able to recruit financially literate
members to fulfill this function through local CPA societies, public
accounting firms, banks, and other financial institutions. 5 Many
CPA societies have a public interest section geared at helping small
nonprofit organizations recruit board members. °6 Public accounting
firms and banks also encourage their employees to serve on charita-
ble boards to increase their visibility within the community.
C. Expertise and Characteristics of Audit Committee Members
Several characteristics of its members could improve the effec-
tiveness of an audit committee. First, audit committee members
104. Nonprofits will certainly need time to adjust to these new requirements and it may take
time, through trial and error, to determine what works best for the organization. In addition,
those performing the audit committee function will need time to establish their own guidelines
and modes of operation.
105. Organizations such as the state CPA societies encourage their membership to become
involved with charities through programs such as CPA's for the Public Interest.
106. For example, the Illinois CPA Society has a "CPAs for the Public Interest" program
aimed at helping charities improve the management of their organizations. See
http://www.cpaspi.org (last visited April 28, 2002).
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should exhibit independence in performing their duties to enhance
the credibility of the committee.117 Boards can establish policies that
promote the independence of audit committee members. Forbidding
employees from serving on the committee,08 prohibiting members
from having business dealings with the organization in their capacity
as a board member, and nepotism policies are examples of ways that
the board can provide for independence for audit committee mem-
bers.
Additionally, an audit committee composed of some financially
literate members is important because they already understand the
importance of sound financial practices.'09 Those bodies establishing
minimum standards for charities should encourage nonprofits to
recruit at least one member who has an accounting or financial
background."" Members who are not financially literate should be
provided with the opportunity to become financially literate within a
reasonable amount of time. The board can determine the required
degree of financial literacy.
D. Functions of the Audit Committee
Audit committees hire the independent auditors (where an inde-
pendent audit is required), which establishes a reporting relationship
between the committee and independent auditors."' Doing so helps
ensure that outside auditors are loyal to the audit committee and not
to management. In working with the audit team, the audit committee
takes part in assessing the quality, not just the acceptability, of
current financial reporting practices."2  This ensures committee
involvement in establishing accounting policies concerning estimates,
judgments, uncertainties, and unusual transactions."3
The audit committee's most vital function in preventing em-
ployee misuse of funds is review of the internal accounting system.
107. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, SAS No. 90, AUDIT COMMITTEE
COMMUNICATIONS (1999) (amending SAS NO. 61, COMMUNICATION WITH AUDIT
COMMITTEES, and SAS NO. 71, INTERIM FINANCIAL INFORMATION).
108. See NYSE Rule 303.01 (1999).
109. See ERNST & YOUNG LLP, supra note 92, at 6.
110. The NYSE model requires that at least one member of the audit committee have an
accounting or financial management background, and that each member be financially literate.
NYSE Rule 303.01 (1999).
111. ERNST& YOUNG LLP, AUDIT COMMITTEES 25 (1992).
112. See ERNST& YOUNG LLP, supra note 92, at 9-10.
113. Id. at 10.
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The method in which this review is accomplished will vary with the
organization; however, all charities, large and small, can help prevent
negative publicity and organizational upset by establishing basic
policies designed to detect and prevent employee fraud.
Among the controls that the audit committee should put in place
are that duties of financial staff are properly segregated, and that
executive expenses are reviewed for appropriateness on a regular
basis." 4 In addition, the audit committee should review and ensure
that financial staff and executives do not have complete and un-
checked access to organization bank accounts and other assets."5
While there is not a one-size-fits-all checklist, audit committees
should ensure that they are operating within these standard guide-
lines, and add additional guidelines as necessary."6
The functions described are generally accepted as good business
practice and do not introduce any new or controversial procedures.
Many well-run organizations, nonprofit and for-profit, already have
procedures such as these in place. As the case studies will show,
misuse of funds can be prevented if someone in the organization
ensures that, at a minimum, simple and routine internal control
procedures are in place. When employee fraud does occur, it can be
detected earlier and dealt with internally, which certainly is prefer-
able to learning about misfeasance or fraud from external sources.
IV. WHO IS MINDING THE TILL? How AUDIT COMMITTEES COULD
HAVE HELPED
A. Case Studies of Large and Small Charity Financial Scandals
1. The United Way Scandal
Perhaps the most infamous case of executive theft in recent his-
tory is that of former United Way of America president, William
Aramony. Aramony was convicted and sentenced to a seven-year
prison term for numerous violations of federal laws for defrauding the
114. HARRY R. REIDER, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO OPERATIONAL AUDITING 54-56
(1994).
115. Id.
116. Randy Dillon, Lessons from the United Way, MGMT. ISSUES, Oct. 1992, at 1, 3-4.
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United Way of America of over six hundred thousand dollars."17
Aramony used the money to pay for "vacations, luxury apartments
and other benefits for himself and his teen-age girlfriend."",, Two
former financial executives of the charity were also found guilty of
diverting charitable funds." 9 The thefts occurred from the mid-1980s
to the early 1990s120 and went undetected by the board of United Way
of America until the media started making inquiries.'2'
In addition to hiding the thefts, Aramony also convinced the
United Way board or executive committee to approve the creation of
several spin-off corporations, even though the information he gave
was insufficient and the rationale he gave for creating the spin-offs
unsound. 2' Once the spin-off activities were incorporated, the board
essentially lost control. 23 The spin-off boards, recruited by Aramony,
were composed of a group of Aramony's friends, which hired the
children of United Way officers at substantial salaries, including
Aramony's son, who was hired as the first president of one of the
spin-offs. 1
24
The United Way board, which included leading figures from the
corporate world,'25 could have easily detected (and possibly pre-
vented) Aramony's activities if they had ensured that an audit
committee function, operating under standard guidelines, was in
place. A report prepared by an investigative firm and a law firm to
examine the allegations against Aramony concluded that internal
control procedures present in most organizations were not in place at
United Way, and that decisions made by management were not
brought before the proper board committees.2 6 The report noted
that there was no travel and expense policy, that officers made
unsubstantiated payments to individuals, and that the chief financial
officer filed no expense reports supporting reimbursed expenses for
117. United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1372-73 (4th Cir. 1996).
118. See Arenson, supra note 2.
119. Aramony, 88 F.3d at 1372-73.
120. Id. at 1373.
121. Charles E. Shepard, Perks, Privileges and Power in a Nonprofit World, WASH. POST,
Feb. 16, 1992, § 1, at Al.
122. Goldschmid, supra note 6, at 634.
123. Id.
124. See DeMott, supra note 48, at 133.
125. See Brody, supra note 59, at 455.
126. See Dillon, supra note 116, at 1,3.
[Vol. 77:963
2002] FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 985
an entire year.127 The cost of the board's failure to provide oversight
was significant in terms of lost donations and damage to United
Way's public image.2 8
2. $7.9 Million Embezzled by American Cancer Society Executive
Daniel Wiant, chief administrative officer of the Ohio division of
the American Cancer Society, recently pled guilty to embezzling $7.9
million from the charity.12 9 Wiant, who had been imprisoned in
Hawaii in the 1980s for fraud,30 began stealing from Cancer Society
bank accounts in April 1997.'13 The organization did not discover that
any money was missing until May 2000, after the FBI alerted the
organization that Wiant had transferred $6.9 million to an Austrian
bank account.'32 Prior to the large transfer, Wiant wrote checks
totaling $650,000 to personal bank accounts he had set up. The
amounts were expensed as consulting fees.'33
The response from one organization executive was, "We would
have found out, but having the FBI find out this way made it easier, in
that the funds were frozen."' 34  Another spokesperson for the
American Cancer Society stated that the organization was "as-
tounded" by the embezzlement, and that financial procedures were
already in place to prevent embezzlement of funds. 35 In response to
the embezzlement, the organization expanded its procedure for
background checks on employees 3 6  and also engaged
PricewaterhouseCoopers, a "Big Five" accounting and audit firm, to
conduct a fraud audit and review the organization's internal con-
trols. 
131
One can only question the adequacy of the financial procedures
and policies that would permit a single person within an organization
127. Id. at 3.
128. See Arenson, supra note 2.
129. Ex-Charity Exec Admits Embezzling $7.9 Million, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 26,2000, News, at 4
[hereinafter Ex-Charity Exec].
130. Matthew Sinclair, Cancer Society Executive Accused of Stealing $7M, NONPROFIT
TIMES, July 2000, at 4.
131. Ex-Charity Exec, supra note 129.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Sinclair, supra note 130.
135. Cancer Society Officer Accused of Stealing, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, June 15, 2000, at
50.
136. Sinclair, supra note 130.
137. Id.
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to transfer nearly $7 million without someone else in the organization
reviewing the transaction or being aware that such a large transaction
had been made. Again, had an audit committee function been in
place, basic internal accounting controls requiring additional approval
for large transactions would have been functioning, and the bank
would not have made the transfer. Although public outrage may not
have reached the same levels as in the United Way case, the public
embarrassment and the costs of a fraud audit and internal control
review by a "Big Five" accounting firm could have been avoided had
the board taken the simple step of ensuring that the organization had
sufficient internal control policies in place.
3. Small-Time Scandal: Illinois Federation of Families
Much less impressive in scale than the United Way or American
Cancer Society scandals, but comparatively far more devastating is
the pending case of theft that occurred at the Illinois Federation of
Families. In this case, an employee embezzled about forty-nine
thousand dollars, or one-sixth of the organization's annual budget. 138
The employee, a part-time bookkeeper for the charity, allegedly
wrote checks to himself from the organization's account using rubber
stamps to forge the signature of authorized signers. 3 9 As a result of
the alleged embezzlement, the charity was forced to cut three of its six
staff members.14
The embezzlement occurred between January 1999 and April
2000, when the activity was detected.141 Court documents show that
during this time there were sixty-nine questionable transactions, most
of which were checks made out to the employee.1 42 The assistant
attorney general stated, "One of the problems with a bookkeeper is
they get all the bills and they get all the past due notices.' 4 He just
threw them away."'-
This situation shows that even boards of small organizations
need an audit committee function in order to prevent and detect
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employee theft. In the Illinois Federation case, one of the most
fundamental internal control procedures, segregation of duties, was
not in place. 45 An audit committee operating under basic guidelines
would have reviewed internal control policies and found that duties
relating to cash were not adequately separated. While smaller
organizations often have difficulty in segregating duties due to limited
resources, a simple control requiring that someone other than the
bookkeeper open mail, and reviews of monthly bank statements and
checks accompanying the bank statements could have caught the
bookkeeper's theft before having to cut half of the organization's
staff. The restriction of the bookkeeper's access to the check-signing
stamp, and the requirement that someone else in the organization
sign checks is another common method of segregating duties that
could have prevented the thefts.
B. Appropriate Board Oversight Could Have Prevented These
Scandals
These real-life examples of theft and scandal that occurred in the
charitable sector provide an opportunity to again bolster the claim
that the board is best positioned to provide oversight and prevent
such scandals from occurring. In each case, the board failed to ensure
that its organization had adopted sufficient internal control policies.
While management should take part of the blame, it is the board, and
not management, that has a fiduciary duty and duty of due care to
ensure that appropriate risk management and fiscal policies are in
place.146 Many cases of embezzlement and fraud are not so easily
detected, but when boards do not ensure that public donations and
charitable assets are protected by even the most fundamental and
standard financial controls,147 there can be no question that these
boards have failed to provide sufficient oversight of the executive and
the organization.148
145. See Jo ANN HANKIN ET AL., FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FOR NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 551 (1998); see also Reider, supra note 114, at 56.
146. See generally Kloman, supra note 102.
147. See REIDER, supra note 114, at 55-56. Factors affecting the reliability of financial data
include the functioning of the board of directors, particularly the audit committee. Internal
controls can be categorized as procedures that address segregation of duties, proper
authorization of transactions, and independent checks on performance and accountability.
148. Goldschmid notes that the quality of nonprofit corporate governance could be
improved by developing guidelines for internal audit procedures. See Goldschmid, supra note 6,
at 650.
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CONCLUSION
The charitable sector must recognize and address the need to
hold boards accountable. Public policy and trust has allowed charities
to largely regulate themselves, and enables charities to pursue a
variety of missions at the lowest possible cost. If the charitable
community is to maintain the public's trust, then change is necessary
to demonstrate that charitable organizations are worthy of this trust
without the need for increased government regulation.
Oversight by an audit committee should be standard practice in
any nonprofit organization. Audit committees have been an institu-
tion in the corporate world for some time, and well-run charitable
organizations already use audit or financial oversight committees.
Industry-wide adoption of audit committees is the lowest-cost, most
effective way to prevent, or at least detect, executive and employee
theft or misuse of funds, and, in the long run, maintain and improve
the public trust in charitable organizations.
